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granting the wife's remedy involves a multiplicity of actions and there-
by places an additional burden on the already overloaded dockets of
the courts.
Perhaps the best statement supporting the wife's right to sue and
rejecting the outdated family unity theory is in the Michigan case of
Buckingham v. Buckinghampr,0 in which the court said that "[the wife]
is in no sense the slave of her husband, and is so far the master of her
own will that she has liberty to remain with her husband, or go from
him, as she pleases; and he has no legal remedy to compel her to re-
turn."5' If other courts would follow Michigan's example and finally
and completely liberate the modern married woman's property rights
from the semi-slavery concept of the common law, a step in the right
direction would be taken, as the legislatures intended by passing the
Married Woman's Property Acts.
It is submitted that the erring wife should be allowed to sue her
husband in ejectment for the possession of her solely owned property
under all circumstances. The only.courts that have denied her this
right are those which strictly construe their narrowly worded Married
Woman's Property Acts, basing such strict construction on the family
unity theory. However, this position is presently untenable due to the
modern tendency to construe Married Woman's Property Acts liberal-
ly and to the many fallacies of the family unity theory. Therefore, it
is concluded that the Delaware Supreme Court in Owens v. Owens has
adopted the best view with respect to this problem.
E. J. SULZBERGER, JR.
ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
IN A CIVIL CASE
The rule excluding evidence obtained by an illegal search and
seizure has been applied almost exclusively in criminal prosecutions
since its introduction into American law. An unusual twist was re-
cently given to the rule when the Supreme Court of Michigan applied
it in a civil action.
In Lebel v. Swincicki,' a civil case for wrongful death, the plain-
tiff tried to establish the drunkenness of the defendant to support
his allegation of the defendant's negligence. The evidence presented
:81 Mich. 89, 45 N.W. 504 (1890).
r'Id. at 505.
1354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.ad 281 (1958).
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on this point included the testimony of a state toxicologist concern-
ing the analysis of blood2 taken from the person of the unconscious
defendant shortly after the accident.3 The evidence was admitted
over the defendant's objection, and judgment was subsequently en-
tered for the plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that "the taking of blood for purposes of analysis from the per-
son of one who is unconscious at the time constitutes a violation of
his rights, and that testimony based on the analysis of such blood
should not be admitted in evidence." 4 However, the court decided
that the conclusiveness of other evidence of the defendant's negligence
precluded reversal.
The development of the law concerning the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained by an illegal search or seizure has been fairly recent.
The common law rule was that admissibility was not affected by the
illegality of the means by which evidence was obtained.-, The exclu-
sive legal remedy of a person wronged by an illegal search and seizure
was a civil action for damages against the trespasser or wrongdoer. It
was felt that there was no reason to exclude the evidence so long as
it was relevant and material. The court would not interrupt the
progress of a trial to consider the collateral issue of the illegality of
the means by which the evidence was obtained.7 A number of juris-
dictions still adhere to this traditional rule.s
2The blood sample was taken from the unconscious defendant by a nurse at the
direction of a physician although there was no evidence that the sample was taken
in connection with the treatment of defendant's injuries. The sample was then
placed in a vial and delivered to a state policeman who sent it to the state crime
detection laboratory where it was analyzed by the toxicologist who testified in the
case. Ibid.
Literature on blood tests for intoxication is extensive. See generally Holcomb,
Alcohol in Relation to Traffic Accidents, i ii A.M.A.J. 1076 (1938); Ladd and Gibson.
Legal Medical Aspects of Blood Tests, 29 Va. L. Rev. 749 (1943); Ladd and Gibson,
The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 Iowa L.
Rev: 191 (1939); Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L.J. 250 (1946);
Rabinowitch, Medico Legal Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication, 39
J. Crim. L&C. 225 (1948); 19 Texas L. Rev. 463 (1941). See also McCormick, Evidence
§ 176 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
'93 N.W.2d at 287.
5See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956); McCormick § 137; 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§§ 2183-2184b (3d ed. 194o) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
8"If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded
his authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would
be responsible for the wrong done." Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 329, 337 (Mass.
1841) quoted in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595, (1904).
-"When papers are offered in evidence the court can take no notice how they
were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a collateral
issue to determine that question." Ibid.
8The common law rule of admissibility is still followed without qualification
in 24 states: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisi-
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The common law doctrine was not seriously challenged by the
courts until Boyd v. United States9 was decided in 1886. In that case
the United States Supreme Court stated that the fourth amendment
prohibition against illegal searches and seizures10 was related to the
fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination" so as to ex-
clude from evidence documents obtained by an illegal search. This
decision was followed by the Supreme Court until 1904 when Adams
v. New York12 virtually repudiated the Boyd case by limiting its ap-
plication to legislative enactments and court procedures which per-
mitted illegal searches and seizures, but not to the admissibility of
evidence even though wrongfully obtained.
The law remained undisturbed on the subject until Weeks v.
United States'3 was decided in 1914 in which the so-called federal,
or exclusionary, rule was adopted by the Supreme Court. The Court
said that evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure was
inadmissible against an accused in a criminal prosecution in a fed-
eral court when a timely objection to the use of such evidence had been
made. Judge Learned Hand, in a later case,' 4 expressed the reason for
the adoption of this rule:
"[E]xclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitu-
tional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against
the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will that wrong be suppressed."'15
The Weeks decision does not of itself apply to the states,' 6 but in
ana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531, 543 (1956).
0116 U.S. 616 (1886).
nDU.S. Const. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated."
uU.S. Const. amend. V: "nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
12192 U.S. 585 (1904).
13232 U.S. 383 (1914).
uUnited States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945).
21d. at 499.
16"As to the papers and property seized by the policemen, it does not appear
that they acted under any claim of Federal authority such as would make the Amend-
ment applicable to such unauthorized seizures .... What remedies the defendant
may have against them we need not inquire, as the Fourth Amendment is not
directed to individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal
Government and its agencies." 232 U.S. at 398.
i96o]
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Rochin v. California17 the Supreme Court held that the Weeks rule
could be applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment' s
in cases which are so barbarous as to shock the judicial conscience.19
Even so, as the Court said in Wolf v. Colorado,20 a violation of the
fourth amendment by state officials does not entitle the accused to
rely on the fourteenth amendment.21 The Weeks rule, however, is
followed by the courts of the federal system and has also been adopted
as a rule of evidence in twenty-four states.
22
Most states adopting the Weeks rule have done so on the same
theories advanced by the Supreme Court. In all of these states it has
been applied exclusively in criminal prosecutions and generally only
when the party seeking to introduce the evidence or his agent was
guilty of the illegal seizure.23 Michigan adopted the exclusionary
rule in 1919 in People v. Marxhausen.24 This decision was based on
a section of the Michigan Constitution25 that is very similar to the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution2 upon which
the Weeks case was based.
Heretofore, Michigan, like all the other states following the ex-
clusionary rule, had limited its application to criminal prosecutions
17342 U.S. 165 (1952), noted in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 192 (1952).
'8U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § i: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."
1342 U.S. at 172.
2'338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21 Ibid. The Court considered the specific protection provided in the fourth
amendment to be so basic as to be included in the general concept of due process
of law, but said the fourteenth amendment would apply to the states only in
order to give the defendant his remedy at law against the offending officials. The
Court would not go so far as to impose upon the states the federal exclusionary rule.
-The Weeks rule has been adopted by 24 states: Alaska, California, Delaware.
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Alabama and Maryland
have statutes that exclude illegally obtained evidence in some cases but allow it
in others. See Annot., 5o A.L.R.2d 531 (1956). See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, app. 33 (1949)-
2ePeople v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935); Gilliam v. Commonwealth,
263 Ky. 342, 92 S.W.2d 346 (1936); State ex rel. Kuhr v. District Court, 82 Mont. 515,
268 Pac. 501 (1928); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956). However, the validity of this
long-established rule has recently been questioned in the federal courts in the case of
Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also Parsons, State-Federal
Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination, 42 Cornell L.Q. 346 (1957).
212o4 Mich. 559, 17r N.W. 557 (1919).
nMichigan Const. art. 2, § lo: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of
every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures." With the
exception of New Jersey and Iowa every state has a similar provision. See Annot.,
50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956).
2 See note 1O supra.
CASE COMMTENTS
in which prosecuting officials had obtained evidence in an illegal
manner.27 Therefore, the Lebel case apparently represents a consider-
able departure from the usual application of the Weeks rule in two
respects: first, the rule was applied in civil litigation; secondly, the
evidence was excluded even though the party offering it was innocent
of any improper actions. The wisdom of these extensions is open
to question.
The Weeks rule by its very nature obstructs the truth by excluding
logically relevant and material testimony.2s For this reason it has been
felt that the rule should be strictly and sparingly applied by the
courts. 29 Under the common law there was a strong policy that all
logically relevant evidence should be admissible. There are two prin-
cipal reasons for the deviation from that traditional rule: (i) to police
the law enforcement agencies by excluding evidence illegally ob-
tained, and (2) to protect fully the civil rights of a defendant from
any infringement.
It is apparent that the first basis is not applicable in the Lebel
case. Since the wrongdoer was neither a party to the case nor an
agent of the party offering the evidence, the exclusion of the evidence
does not constitute a sanction against the offending party.30 There-
fore, the protection of the offended party's constitutional rights is
-1E.g., People v. Bissonette, 327 Mich. 349, 42 N.W.2d t13 (1950); People v.
Stein, 265 Mich. 61o, 251 NAV. 788 (1933); People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171
NA. 557 (1919).
2nVigmore refers to the Weeks rule as one of: "those rules which rest on no
purpose of improving the search after truth, but on the willingness to yield to re-
quirements of Extrinsic Policy." 8 Wigmore § 2175. See also McCormick § 74.
2"Owing perhaps to the plain impracticability of pushing the Federal rule to
its logical extreme in all aspects, the Federal Courts have set strict limits to it in its
later development." 8 Wigmore § 2184a. Both Wigmore and McCormick have stated
that the rule for the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained should be classified
as a rule of privilege rather than a rule of exclusion. The rationale behind this
classification is that the rule does not exclude evidence because of the unreliability
of such evidence but because of the illegality of means by which it was obtained.
Therefore, as in the case with all privileges, the rule should be applied very strictly
and sparingly.
31The possible result of this rule may be compared with an example used by
Wigmore in parable form. "Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lot-
tery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer
imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But nol We shall let you both
go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus'
conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and of
teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidently of securing respect for the
Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man
who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else." 8 Wigmore
§ 2184.
196o]
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the only remaining basis upon which exclusion of such evidence may
be justified. The Michigan Supreme Court felt that the circumstances
in the Lebel case were analogous to cases in which a defendant is
compelled to submit to a physical examination while on the witness
stand and therefore is a violation of a constitutional privilege.3 ' This
analogy appears questionable because there is no element of compul-
sion in Lebel; the plaintiff merely sought to introduce evidence ob-
tained by a third party while the defendant was unconscious. 3 2 How-
ever, it is not contended that there can be no violation of constitu-
tional rights in a civil case. But it should be borne in mind that the
Weeks doctrine, which was designed to prevent violations of civil
rights, obstructs the quest for truth-the ultimate goal of any trial.
Therefore, it has always been recognized that the rule should be ap-
plied only when the ends of justice are thereby served. To apply the
rule in a civil case, especially when the evidence was not obtained by
unreasonable or barbaric methods, seems inequitable. While the con-
stitutional rights of the defendant may be protected by this exten-
sion, the innocent plaintiff's right to just compensation for his in-
juries is thereby prejudiced. This result was not reached in the Lebel
case because other conclusive evidence precluded reversal, but to
allow the extension to be applied when the plaintiff's case depends
on the excluded evidence will result in this injustice.
ROBERT E. SHEPHERD, JR.
" 9 3 N.W.2d at 285-87, citing People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274, 221 N.W. 309
(1928); Cluett v. Rosenthal, ioo Mich. 193, 58 N.W. ioo9 (1894); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Evans, 183 Miss. 859, 184 So. 426 (1938); Haynes v. Haynes, 43 N.Y.S.2d
315 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
'"In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel
of the privilege, [against self-incrimination] in history and in the constitutional
definitions, but testimonial compulsion." 8 Wigmore § 2263. See also State v. Berg,
76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953).
